Since the 2008 global financial crisis, populism has emerged as a powerful force influencing elections and policy in many Western democracies. Political scientists have demonstrated that populism tends to flourish during tough economic times and when civic institutions are weak and insular. As Robert Putnam, however, has noted, civic institutions with broad membership can counter this trend, especially when paired with a plan for sustained economic renewal.
Supported by the Center for Civic Society at the USC Schaeffer Institute for Public Policy & Government Service, we are developing a survey-based index tracking the relationship between civic and economic decline and political attitudes over time. We aim to show how adults’ daily social interactions shape their political views, deepening our understanding of the key drivers behind populist politics. Ultimately, we are designing our research to guide strategic policy decisions, highlighting which public resources and civic investments offer the greatest positive impact.
In July 2025, our research team collected our first round of what will be annual survey data collection from approximately 32,000 adults across nationally representative samples in 20 countries.[1] The main takeaways from our first poll are 1) a pervasive sense of social, economic, and political decline, 2) minimal participation in civic groups, and 3) those participating in civic groups have more contact with people of a different race, ethnicity, religion, or social class—while those supporting populist nationalist parties[2] are least likely to be part of diverse groups.
1. Across all of the countries we surveyed, respondents conveyed a pervasive sense of social, political, and economic decline.
Alongside apprehension for the future,[3] we found a marked nostalgia for the past. Across nearly every country, a majority agree that “society has thrown away too much of what worked well before” as well as that “our country’s traditional values are being ignored” (Figure 1). Meanwhile, 66% globally agreed that “we have lost touch with the values that built this nation” – with South Korea (44%) and Japan (40%) as the only exceptions.
We also measured widespread distrust in governments (Figure 2). For example, in the United States only 25% say they trust the government compared with just under half (49%) who distrust it. When we asked if people felt the political system was broken, a majority agreed in every country. In Spain, Argentina, France, South Africa and the United States, more than three-quarters felt it was broken.
People in every country feel the economy is not working for them. Roughly half of people in every country feel they are poorer than they expected to be (Figure 3). In both the UK (56%) and the U.S. (61%), a majority are financially disappointed.
2. In their everyday life, most people do not participate in any social groups.
Putnam and others’ seminal work suggests those in stronger communities tend to have less polarized political beliefs and better perceptions of their economic circumstances. We asked survey respondents which types of groups they participated in giving a full range of options such as: sports clubs, trade unions, political parties, cultural groups, volunteering for charitable organizations and professional organizations. The most common answer by far was “none at all” (Figure 4). Across all countries, 45% of people say they do not participate in a single civic association, group or club. Notably, the most common types of group in almost every country are sports clubs (17%) followed by exercise classes and religious groups (both 13%) and then volunteering/charity (12%). Political parties were the least common group of all to be part of, at only 4%.
Asking people how often they participate shows meaningful participation rates are even lower, with wide variation between countries (Figure 5). While only 20% in Japan say they participate in at least one activity at least once per month, 60% do in South Africa. Across all 20 countries, just 40% of individuals participated in an activity with any meaningful frequency, pointing to the decline of civic activity as a global rather than national issue.
As shown by Figure 6, across every country, those who participate are significantly more likely to report a higher sense of community belonging on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all true” and 5 being “very true.”
The decline in in-person contact is not limited to associational life. Figure 7 shows 65% of people report having three close friends or fewer while 12% say they have no close friends at all.
The number of friends people have is correlated with whether they participate in civic groups (Figure 8). Two-thirds of those who say they have no close friends do not participate in anything, and only one-third say they do participate. For those with more than four friends, 64% participate while 36% say they do not take part in any group.
We also find participating in civic activities is associated with engaging with people from a wider variety of backgrounds. Contact across lines of difference (of race, class or religion) can break down barriers and increase social cohesion. Participating in civic groups is strongly correlated with regularly meeting others across lines of political, social, and ethical differences, which Putnam describes as “bridging” connections (Figure 9). Only 7% of those who participate in groups say they never meet others who are different from them compared with 23% of those who do not participate. Conversely, of those who participate in groups, 63% report bridging interaction either daily or weekly compared with 46% of those who do not participate.
3. Right-wing populist voters tend to be members of less politically diverse groups.
The story is more nuanced than simply those who participate in civic groups are less likely to vote for populist nationalist parties. Rather, greater percentages of group members with little political diversity identify as populist nationalists while those who attend groups with lots of diversity demonstrate lower rates of populist nationalist support. For example, across all survey participants, 21% report voting for populist nationalist parties. For those who take part in a religious organization that is very politically homogenous and thus offers fewer opportunities for forming bridging connections, 26% report voting for populist nationalists. For those who participate in a very diverse religious organization, the percentage is 17%. Figure 10 shows these relationships for the group types we show in Figure 4 above.
Next steps: explain how everyday social experiences relate to institutional satisfaction and populist nationalist support.
We are using these results and another round currently in the field to build a statistical model that will help us explain how everyday social experiences (e.g., trust in neighbors, participation in diverse social groups, support networks, and perceived economic circumstances) relate to cultural backlash, institutional trust, inclusivity, and economic optimism, and in turn, predict support for populist nationalist parties and policies. We will use our model to provide clear and actionable guidance policymakers can use to address the root causes of populist nationalism. We expect to publish a paper describing our study in early 2027.
[1] The U.S., Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa
[2] Based on coding from Stanford’s Votes for Populists dataset, in turn based on Cas Mudde’s 2007 definition on the populist right.
[3] We asked whether people were “optimistic about the condition of their country as a whole.” Only in Argentina did more than 40% answer that they were optimistic and even then it was only 44%. In the UK, France, Spain and Italy less than a quarter were optimistic.